signal to states with deadlines in the coming years on how their
own cases will be handled. The precedent set at the 9MSP would
either discourage states from presenting unjustified extension
requests or it would let them know that “anything goes.”
The views put forward by the Analyzing Group were critically important because they provided the basis on which other
states took their decisions at the 9MSP. Despite the importance
of their role, a small number of states in the Analyzing Group
encouraged a passive and uncritical role for the group, reportedly politicizing and personalizing the workings of the group.
They also fought hard to keep the group’s work closed and secretive, which is highly unusual for the work of the Ottawa
Convention, born out of a close collaboration between states
and nongovernmental partners. Despite these constraints, the
group managed to produce several final analyses with useful
constructive criticism. But the analyses clearly applied different
standards to different states, showing the regional bias of some
Analyzing Group members. Perhaps the most positive outcome
of the group’s work was the proactive engagement with the requesting states that in some cases led to new requests reflecting
improved planning.
The 9MSP and the End Game
After the analyses were given to the other States Parties, it
was their turn to reflect on and guide the outcome at the 9MSP.
The treaty says that the MSP, or Review Conference, shall “assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States
Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for
an extension period.”1 The question was therefore how states
would react to those requests that did not merit approval as
presented. As noted above, the first action was for the Analyzing Group to try to get certain countries to amend the requests,
including the amount of time requested. This approach was the
most logical and diplomatic way of dealing with the problem,
and it worked in a few cases. States did, of course, have the option to turn down the request, but that would mean that the
country would be in violation of the treaty when its deadline
passes, and therefore, States Parties were reluctant to consider
this possibility.
The solution proposed by the President of the 9MSP, Ambassador Jurg Streuli of Switzerland, was for states to grant all
requests as drafted, but with comments from States Parties that
in certain cases encouraged the country to complete the demining work faster than planned and/or to clarify other outstanding issues of concern in the requests.
This approach was satisfactory for most cases, but the ICBL
was still calling for States Parties to turn down requests from
any state that had no plans to begin demining operations before
its original 10-year deadline, namely the United Kingdom and
Venezuela. States Parties chose to focus their criticism on the
United Kingdom, which, unlike Venezuela, presented a request
for the maximum 10 years with no timeline or budget for beginning, let alone finishing, its demining duties. In essence, they
were asking for carte blanche to implement Article 5 if and when
it liked. States Parties understood that such a request would be
highly detrimental to the treaty and therefore spoke out publicly
and privately against it. The United Kingdom tried to calm its
critics by announcing that it would launch a tender in 2009 to
begin demining three of its 117 mined areas and by arguing that
a feasibility study with a range of vague demining options actually constituted a concrete plan.
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In the end, States Parties’ dissatisfaction with these small
steps coupled with their continued concern about the implications of a “no” vote for the treaty led to a compromise outcome. The United Kingdom’s request, along with the other 14
requesting parties, was approved without a vote, and each was
accompanied by comments in the form of an MSP decision. In
the United Kingdom’s language, it agreed to return to States
Parties within 1.5 years with more details about its work plan,
to provide regular progress reports, and to consider on an annual basis if it would be possible to reduce the time necessary
to finish its demining duties. States Parties also encouraged
the United Kingdom—along with Ecuador, Peru and Senegal—
to finish demining more quickly than initially planned. The
decision for Venezuela was the weakest, commenting simply
that it “may find itself in a situation wherein it could complete
implementation before October 2014 and that this could benefit the Convention.” Other useful comments in the analyses
did not make it into the final decisions because the concerned
states were given the chance to approve the decision language.
Conclusion
Despite some shortcomings, the first extension request
decision process produced a solid foundation on which the
future implementation of Article 5 can rest. States Parties that
asked for more time to demine were challenged to show that
they were truly seeking the minimum time necessary to complete the work. The process could still use improvement—to
prevent regional discrepancies in the treatment of requests
for example—but overall States Parties confirmed that there
will be no rubber-stamping of requests and made it clear that
the duty to demine “as soon as possible” also applies to the
extension period.
See Endnotes, page 112
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The Case of Mozambique
With the impending 2009 Ottawa Convention1 deadline quickly approaching, it has become clear
that Mozambique will not be able to complete their required obligations without an extension.
Dwindling funding, inadequate resources and the challenge of other internal problems have
delayed the mine-action progress, but what will be the solution?
by Maria Isabel Macedo dos Santos [ Instituto Nacional de Desminagem Mozambique ]
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A

decade has passed since the signing of the Ottawa Convention and the commitment of the States Parties to
work toward eradicating landmines in all affected countries. In this period, significant progress on landmine clearance
and victim assistance has been registered, and significant areas
have been cleared and released to the communities.
The Progress
Mozambique signed and ratified the Ottawa Convention, becoming a State Party in March 1999. In May 1999, Mozambique
hosted the First Meeting of States Parties in its capital, Maputo.
In compliance with Ottawa Convention Article 4, Mozambique
destroyed its anti-personnel landmine stockpiles in February
2003 and has been conducting clearance activities to meet the
March 2009 deadline.
Like many affected countries, Mozambique has endured war
and destabilization for more than 30 years, leaving landmines
and unexploded ordnance spread all over the country. In 1992
when the government and the then-rebel movement Resistência

Nacional de Moçambique (RENAMO) signed a peace agreement
in Rome, the United Nations dispatched its peacekeeping mission, and one of its mandates included demining operations.
Mozambique has been demining its countryside since then.
The Problem
Mozambique faces many other challenges, including poverty,
natural disasters and endemic diseases such as HIV/AIDS. The
majority of its population is rural and, consequently, the presence of landmines and other UXO constitutes a major impediment to the economic and social development of affected areas.
Fifteen years of demining activities have elapsed, surveys
have been conducted and thousands of square meters of land
have been released to the people. A recent baseline assessment,
carried out by The HALO Trust in the remaining affected areas,
has shown that there is work to be done to comply with Article
52 of the Ottawa Convention. The 2009 Convention deadline is
approaching, and the landmine problem is far from solved. Out
of the 36 States Parties with deadlines for 2009 and 2010, only 10
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have completed clearance obligations—12 may meet the obligation, and at least 14 will request an extension to meet it. Mozambique
is included in the list of those needing an extension.3
Mozambique has made earnest efforts to support mineaction activities—demining has been integrated into government plans to reduce poverty as a cross-cutting priority. This
measure clearly shows its commitment to demining and to the
Ottawa Convention.
The challenge remains: With a myriad of priority areas to
be funded, resources are limited. Clearance itself relies heavily
on industrialized world technology and funding. Paradoxically,
it costs as little as US$3 to produce a landmine yet as much as
$1,000 to remove it once it has been emplanted.4 Mozambique
has benefited from financial and technical support from the donor community; however, due to the country’s low level of economic development, Mozambique’s needs always exceed the
resources available.
It is vital to mention that the Convention has played a very
important role in limiting the proliferation of anti-personnel
mines; however, actual mine clearance is an essential component of the solution to the global problem. 5
Contrary to what was expected, the f low of funds from
donors for clearance activities has declined year after year. In
the case of Mozambique, different international nongovernmental organizations have left the country or are in the process
of phasing out their activities. This situation is of great concern
because landmine-affected States Parties are faced with insufficient funding to continue demining activities and, thereby, fulfill their Ottawa Convention deadlines.
What is the Next Step?
Article 6 of the Ottawa Convention states that each State
Party has the right to seek and receive assistance for the fulfillment of its Convention obligations and to request assistance in
the implementation of its national mine-action plan.6 States also
have the responsibility to make an effort to meet the Convention deadlines. Although the government of Mozambique has
been increasing its funding to mine action, mine clearance has
proven costly, and external funding is crucial for Mozambique
to reach its final goal.
It is clear that the failure to meet the deadline means that
Mozambique, and many other countries, will need more resources. Mine action must compete for the same resources as
other problems, namely poverty, endemic diseases, and the effects of high oil and food prices. This battle of priorities puts immense pressure on donors and States Parties, and mine action is
likely to lose the tug of war for funding.
As Olivier Vodoz, then-President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, mentioned on his statement to the 8th
Meeting of the States Parties7 in Jordan in 2007, “Every day
during which the Convention‘s deadline is not met is a day in
which civilians are put at risk. The Mine Ban Convention will be
judged on the basis of States Parties’ capacity to manage clearance deadlines in a way which maintains the credibility of the
Convention and creates maximum pressure for completion before the deadline or within a realistic well-planned and adequately funded extension period.”8
At this juncture, it is necessary to look at different countries,
their level of contamination, and the resources available to assist
them in safely and cheaply clearing their lands of these deadly
weapons. Mozambique benefited from the recent baseline assessment conducted by The HALO Trust. The results of the sur-
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vey informed the five-year strategic plan (2008–2012) written to
guide the implementation of mine-action activities during the
extension. According to Mozambique’s projections, on average,
an estimated US$5.9 million is needed every year for more than
six years in order to meet the Convention obligations.9
Efforts undertaken to release cleared land to communities
have had positive socioeconomic consequences. Communities
and their inhabitants are the ultimate beneficiaries of land release. In areas still considered affected, the presence of landmines and UXO has a major negative impact on communities.
Completing mine clearance would clearly benefit the communities by allowing the citizens to work on their land, and would
therefore contribute toward the reduction of poverty.
It is time to look into the problems that most States Parties
have encountered along the 10 years of the treaty’s existence.
Collective analysis of each state’s challenges and shortcomings
will help provide appropriate data to support reaching the goals
the Convention was ultimately set to achieve. For countries like
Mozambique, the extension must be granted and coordinated,
and donor support should follow to enable the implementation
of the national strategic program.
States bear the primary responsibility in designing and implementing strategies, plans and programs for mine action within their borders. However, many States Parties like Mozambique
are still in need of assistance. The United Nations Development
Programme, other international organizations, nongovernmental organizations and governments able to do so should play
a vital role by mainstreaming mine action into their activities
in mine-affected countries. In addition, local capacity building
should be at the center of every effort to ensure sustainability of
mine action in these countries.
The challenge is great, but there is an equally great opportunity to attain the goals of the Convention through coherent,
coordinated and collective action.
See Endnotes, page 112
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Mechanical Demining: From 1942
to the Present
Although demining machines have been in existence since 1942, they were not used in
the field of mine action until about the early 1990s. Demining machines were initially only
used by the military. With the growing number of casualties stemming from landmines,
especially among civilians, it became necessary to employ machines for humanitarian
purposes. From the first demining machine constructed in early 1942 to the present,
tremendous improvements have been made.
by Pehr Lodhammar
[ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ]

T

he first demining machine is believed to have been developed by Major Abraham du Toit, a South African
soldier and engineer. In early 1942, he was sent to
England to refine a demining machine prototype he had
constructed in South Africa.
Before leaving for England, du Toit discussed his ideas
with Captain Norman Berry, a British mechanical engineer. Berry conducted his own unofficial experiments with
flails in Libya before providing the results to another British officer at an army workshop in Egypt. This collaboration resulted in the development of the Matilda Scorpion,
a Matilda tank fitted with a rotor mounted on two arms
at the front. The rotor carried 24 flails and was driven at
100 revolutions per minute by a 105-horsepower Ford V8
engine. A second engine was fitted with an armored box
mounted on the right side of the tank. This box included
space for a crew member, who operated the flail.
A number of these vehicles were produced and became
operational in October 1942 when they were used in the
Second Battle of El Alamein (23 October to 5 November
1942). Although the clearance speed was slow, the Scorpion
operators were able to conceal the machines from German
soldiers because of the huge dust cloud they formed; however, the dust cloud also blinded and affected the breathing of the drivers, so crews had to wear gas masks in order
to breathe.
The first flails were not as successful as expected. They
were unreliable, with frequent breakdowns. Problems were
also encountered with the heat and dust, a problem encountered with flails today. The first Matilda Scorpion was followed by several similar machines such as the Mark II, III,
IV and V versions of the Scorpion. Version V was mounted
on the Sherman tank.
Other flails that followed included the Matilda Baron
and the Sherman Crab. The Crab ran on the tank’s main
engine, had 43 flail hammers and included a rotor for
cutting barbed wire to prevent the flail from getting entangled. The flail also had a mechanism to ensure that it
followed ground contours and had extra protection in the
form of a blast shield. This flail did not clear all mines and

The revolving drum and chains on a Matilda Scorpion flail tank. 17 April 1942.
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could only move at very low speeds; however, the Crab was
used during and after the D-Day landings and allowed the
Allied Forces to advance through the German minefields.
Up to the end of the 1980s, demining machines were
only used by the military. In the early 1990s, however, the
need for demining machines for humanitarian purposes
was recognized, and the machines were introduced into
countries such as Afghanistan and Angola. Initially, military carriers were used, but later purpose-built carriers
were developed.1 Early machines were often clumsy, unreliable and underpowered. The clearance results also fell below the minimum United Nations’ requirement.
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